This paper assesses the impact on neighborhood population dynamics of a major urban renewal policy implemented in Catalonia (Spain) between 2004 and 2010. Some of the most deprived neighborhoods in the region received large investments in their public spaces and facilities with the aim of attracting natives and high income individuals and of reducing the concentration of poverty and immigration. The control group comprises rejected projects and projects accepted towards the end of the program that, due to a fall in public tax revenues, were never executed. The results suggest that the urban renewal projects had little (if any) effects on population dynamics, suggesting that substantial investment in deprived neighborhoods is insufficient to attract natives and/or high income households. Interestingly, the sole exception were the interventions made in Barcelona's historic districts, where the policy seems to have augmented ongoing processes of urban revival into its most deprived neighborhoods furthering processes of gentrification. 
Introduction
There are large differences in income across cities (Moretti, 2012) ; yet, at the same time, all cities, be they vibrant or lagging, present evidence of substantial inequality across their neighborhoods. Indeed, it would appear that in some regions of the world income differences are greater within than they are across cities. For example, Rosenthal and Ross (2015) report that while the interquartile range in the distribution of city income in the US is about 25%, the corresponding figure for neighborhood income within these cities is as high as 55%. Moreover, evidence suggests that within city income inequality is increasing both in the US (Watson, 2009) and in Europe (Tammaru et al., 2016) . Partly because income correlates with racial and ethnic backgrounds, and partly due to social interactions in relation to the demand for housing (Card et al., 2008) , a salient feature of the urban landscape is residential segregation along lines of race and ethnicity (Cutler et al., 1999; Boustan, 2011) .
Various reasons can be forwarded for seeking to reduce income and ethnic segregation at the city level. The first corresponds to reasons of local externalities. The socioeconomic characteristics of neighborhoods have been found to affect individual performance in both education (Chetty et al., 2016) and the labor market (Bayer et al., 2008; Chetty et al., 2016) and to impact both criminal behavior (Damm and Dustmann, 2014) and welfare use (Ȧslund and Fredriksson, 2009 ). Exploiting variation in racial segregation across US cities, Cutler et al. (1999) and Ananat (2011) further show that minorities perform worse in more segregated cities. Hence, residential segregation could contribute to amplify performance differences between income and ethnic groups. Second, multiple equilibria are a prominent feature of neighborhood ethnic composition (Schelling, 1971; Card et al., 2008) and, thus, public policies aimed at deconcentrating poverty can potentially be welfare enhancing.
Policies aimed at deconcentrating poverty and minority population groups abound in OECD countries (Cheshire, 2009 ). These initiatives, often known as income-mixing policies, fall into two broad categories (Boustan, 2011) . The first encompasses policies that encourage low income households to move into more affluent neighborhoods and include, for example, the Section 8 and the Moving to Opportunity programs in the US. The second category consists of policies that seek to improve deprived neighborhoods so as to attract higher income individuals.
Major programs falling into this category include the HOPE VI and the Community Development Block Grant in the US and the URBAN projects in the EU 1 . While the reasons outlined above are used to justify measures aimed at reducing segregation, income-mixing policies are controversial for three reasons (Cheshire, 2009) 2 . First, neighborhood effects are much smaller 1 Sweden and Denmark, in a policy more explicitly related to ethnic enclaves, adopted refugee dispersal measures in the late 80s to reduce the concentration of immigrants in specific neighborhoods and urban areas (Edin et al., 2003; Damm and Dustmann, 2014) . Around the same time, Singapore introduced ethnic quotas at the neighborhood level, limiting housing transactions that could further increase segregation (Wong, 2013) . 2 An additional cost of income-mixing policies might be the disruptive effects of mobility on teenagers (Gibbons et al., 2016; Chetty et al., 2016) .
than the raw correlations suggest (Topa and Zenou, 2015) . Second, if income-mixing policies work, investing in deprived neighborhoods will increase housing prices and cause gentrification, suggesting that such policies might end up hurting (rather than helping) the low income residents of the targeted neighborhoods. Finally, while income-mixing policies are costly, the effectiveness of such initiatives is unclear. The goal of this paper, therefore, is to assess the effectiveness of place-based policies that invest in deprived neighborhoods in order to deconcentrate poverty and immigration. To this end, we evaluate the effects on population dynamics at the neighborhood level of a prominent place-based policy implemented in the Spanish region of Catalonia.
The Catalan Neighborhoods Act was passed in 2004 by the regional government with the objective of deconcentrating poverty and immigration through the improvement of public spaces and public use facilities in some of the region's most deprived neighborhoods. The policy was adopted in the middle of the Spanish immigration wave, when the share of immigrant population was rising rapidly, especially in low income urban neighborhoods (Fernández-Huertas et al., 2015) . In the areas we study, immigration rose by more than 8.5 percentage points in the three-year period preceding the start of the policy. The intervention was implemented through annual calls for proposals, with an annual budget of 99 million EUR between 2004 and 2010.
However, note that due to the fall in public sector revenues and the project length (4 years), the degree of execution was low among those projects accepted in the 2008-2010 calls for funding.
For this reason, we focus on the 39 interventions corresponding to the 2004-2007 calls, with an average investment of 3,065 EUR per inhabitant. The intervention areas present an average population of 13,000 inhabitants, reflecting one of the policy guidelines, namely that of concentrating large investments in specific locations.
The selection process consisted of two rounds. In the first round, a deprivation index was calculated for each application made, using 20 socioeconomic indicators of neighborhood characteristics. Neighborhoods scoring above a certain threshold were included in the second round, when the projects were ranked according to a final score determined by this deprivation index (with a weight of 40%) and an assessment of the projects' characteristics. Our pool of control neighborhoods comprises the rejected projects and the projects accepted in the 2008-2010 calls that were never executed. As the most deprived neighborhoods were treated first, the projects accepted at the initial calls differ significantly from the control neighborhoods. Moreover, these differences translate into differential pre-treatment trends in neighborhood population dynamics, making it inappropriate to apply standard differences-in-differences estimators. We therefore adopt the Oaxaca-Blinder estimator, as developed by Kline (2011) and as recently used in Busso et al. (2014) and Kline and Moretti (2014) , to evaluate place-based policies. Interestingly, here, we have access to all the neighborhood indicators used by the policy-makers when selecting the treated, which reduces the risk that unobserved neighborhood characteristics confound our treatment estimates.
The results suggest that the urban renewal projects had no effects on the population dynamics of the intervention areas, indicating that substantial investment in public spaces and facilities is insufficient to attract native and/or high income households to deprived neighborhoods.
The one notable exception are the urban renewal projects carried out in the historic districts of Barcelona, the one large metropolitan area in the region. Here, the policy attracted native and EU15 college graduates. Overall, the policy reduced the share of non-EU15 immigrants by more than 5 percentage points and increased the share of population with a college degree by 16 percentage points. Since the late 1990s, the Barcelona city center has experienced an urban revival process and our findings suggest that the Neighborhoods Act intensified this process in some of the city's most deprived historic districts.
To guide the empirical findings, we develop a residential choice model with two neighborhoods and two population groups: natives and (low-income) immigrants. Native and immigrant neighborhood valuations rise in line with increased urban renewal investment, and the two groups present idiosyncratic residential preferences with regard to neighborhoods. Additionally, native utility is decreasing with the (square of the) immigrant share in the neighborhood, giving rise to multiple equilibria in a one-sided tipping model to use the terminology of Card et al. (2008) . In mixed equilibria, investment in the neighborhood increases native willingness to pay more than immigrants can pay and, so, the place-based policy reduces the immigrant share in the neighborhood. However, when the minority share lies beyond the tipping point, urban renewal investment might be insufficient to attract natives to the neighborhood and the policy will have no impact on the neighborhood's ethnic composition. Our results are consistent with this latter scenario in which the urban renewal policy is unable to reverse the tipping process. -Hansberg et al. (2010) , Ahlfeldt et al. (2016) and Koster and Van Ommeren (2015) estimate housing externalities arising from urban renewal policies. Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2010) study a policy implemented in Richmond (Virginia) while Ahlfeldt et al. (2016) examine interventions in Berlin following re-unification. Using housing prices for renovated and nonrenovated dwellings, these two studies estimate housing externalities in terms of the extent to which the value of a property depends on the quality of the nearby housing stock. While both papers analyze policies aimed at renovating the private housing stock, Koster and Van Ommeren (2015) analyze a Dutch program that targeted the public housing stock. They estimate the housing externalities caused by the policy in terms of both prices and sales times. Our paper differs from these studies in two respects. First, instead of estimating housing externalities, we assess the effectiveness of urban renewal measures for reducing income and ethnic segregation in cities, the primary goals of these policies. Second, while the above papers study programs targeting the housing stock, we examine an intervention that improved public spaces and public use facilities.
Rossi
Our paper is closely related to Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) housing prices as well as in the income and the non-minority share in the neighborhood 3 . The results in this latter paper suggest that building affordable housing in disadvantaged areas can be a more effective tool for reducing income and ethnic segregation than simply improving the public spaces and facilities of these areas.
Our paper is also related to the literature (surveyed in Neumark and Simpson (2015) ) that analyzes the effects of enterprise zones, focused mainly on the US and France 4 . Although enterprise zones are also place-based policies that target deprived neighborhoods, they differ from the urban renewal policy studied here in that they focus on tax incentives aimed at boosting local employment.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we develop a theoretical framework to understand the potential effects of urban renewal policies on the composition of the population in a neighborhood. Section 3 describes the urban renewal policy studied here, while section 4 introduces the data and the variables used. In section 5 we explain the empirical approach adopted in the paper. The results are presented in section 6 and section 7 concludes.
Theoretical framework
In this section, we develop a residential choice model with two neighborhoods and two population groups (natives and immigrants). The model is a variant of those developed in Banzhaf (2013) and Busso et al. (2014) ; while studies of the French experience include Gobillon et al. (2012) , Givord et al. (2013 ), Briant et al. (2015 and Mayer et al. (2015) .
Model set-up
There are two neighborhoods in the city. The size of neighborhoods 1 and 2 are fixed and given by S and 1−S, respectively. In turn, there are two population groups, natives (N ) and immigrants (I ), respectively. Each individual consumes one unit of housing and overall city population is normalized to one, with P denoting the city-wide immigrant share. P 1 and P 2 are the immigrant shares in neighborhoods 1 and 2, with P = SP 1 + (1 − S)P 2 . We restrict our analysis to equilibria in which P 1 ≥ P 2 . We further assume that S ≤ P < 0.5, to allow the possibility that neighborhood 1 becomes a ghetto (P 1 = 1).
If residing in community 1, natives' utility is given by
Y N is income and Q is the price of housing in the neighborhood. The term α(P 1 ) reflects that natives care about the ethnic composition of the neighborhood. We return to the nature of the function α below. Natives also value the exogenous amenity G where γ N > 0. The amenity value is assumed to increase as a consequence of urban renewal investments. The only individualspecific utility component is a n , which reflects the attachment of individual n to neighborhood 1, and it is uniformly distributed in the unit interval, i.e. a n ∼ U (0, 1). In neighborhood 2, the values of Q and G are normalized to zero, implying that natives' utility in neighborhood 2 is
Similarly, immigrants' utilities in neighborhoods 1 and 2 are U
I , respectively, with a i ∼ U (0, 1). Note that unlike natives, immigrants' utility does not depend directly on the neighborhood ethnic composition. This assumption is based on evidence that suggests racial segregation is (largely) driven by the desire of non-minority residents to avoid neighborhoods with a high minority share (Cutler et al., 1999; Card et al., 2008; Boustan, 2011) .
We further assume that the natives' income is higher than that of immigrants (Y N > Y I ) and that γ N > γ I ≥ 0, as higher income is associated with a higher willingness to pay for amenities (Kuminoff et al., 2013; Kahn and Walsh, 2015) 5 .
To study the effects of investment on the population composition of the neighborhoods, we focus on the minority share in neighborhood 1, which fully determines the proportions of both groups in the two neighborhoods 6 . There are two types of equilibrium. In a mixed equilibrium, neighborhood 1 is inhabited by both natives and immigrants (P 1 < 1) while in a ghetto, neighborhood 1 only hosts immigrants (P 1 = 1).
Note that there are always immigrants in the two neighborhoods, implying that there is an immigrant who is indifferent between neighborhoods, with a willingness to pay for neighborhood 1 given by Q(a i * ) = γ I G + a i * . In a mixed equilibrium, there is also an indifferent native, whose willingness to pay to live in neighborhood 1 amounts to Q(a n * ) = −α(P 1 ) + α(P 2 ) + γ N G + a n * . In equilibrium, the two marginal residents' willingness to pay must be equal, i.e.
5 Koster et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence regarding this assumption for the case of historic amenities in Dutch cities. 6 Note that P 2 = (P − S P 1 )/(1 − S), while the proportion of natives in neighborhoods 1 and 2 are N 1 = 1 − P 1 and
Q(a i * ) = Q(a n * ). Solving this equation gives us the equilibrium immigrant share and housing price in neighborhood 1 7 :
and:
If we assume that α is a linear function with α > 0, then there is a unique mixed equilibrium. This equilibrium will be stable if social interactions are moderate. Specifically, the equilibrium will be stable if αP (1 − P ) < S(1 − S). Otherwise, the mixed equilibrium is unstable and the neighborhood will be either in P 1 = 0 or in P 1 = 1 8 . If the mixed equilibria is unstable, then the resulting outcome is a two-sided tipping model to the use Card et al. (2008)'s terminology.
In a two-sided model of this type, neighborhoods to the left of the mixed equilibrium evolve towards P 1 = 0 while those that to the right of it evolve towards P 1 = 1. This type of equilibrium is inconsistent with the neighborhood dynamics documented in Card et al. (2008) and in Card et al. (2011) . In fact, the evidence supports one-sided tipping models, which predict that mixed neighborhoods are dynamically stable for low minority shares but that they quickly evolve towards a full minority equilibrium (P 1 = 1) once they surpass the tipping point.
In order to obtain a one-sided tipping model, we assume that α is quadratic, i.e. α(P i ) = αP i 2 with α > 0. 9 If social interactions are sufficiently strong, i.e. α is sufficiently large, the model can present two mixed equilibria. Then, the first of these (with the lower minority share) will be stable while the second will be unstable, as illustrated in Figure 1 (a) 10 . The solid line is the natives' willingness to pay curve. When the minority share is low, the willingness to pay increases with P 1 as preference heterogeneity dominates the social interaction effect. However, for higher minority shares, the social interaction becomes relatively more important and the curve slopes downwards. Since immigrants' willingness to pay curve (dashed line) slopes downwards due to preference heterogeneity, two mixed equilibria arise. Consider the low minority share equilibrium depicted in point A. If a shock decreases the minority share, the immigrants' willingness to 7 We have used the fact a i * = 1 − S(P 1 /P ), a n * = 1 − S((1 − P 1 )/(1 − P )) and P 2 = (P − SP 1 )/(1 − S). 8 Specifically, if α is a linear function it turns out that
We obtain the same qualitative results if instead we assume that natives prefer to live in neighborhoods with a minority share that is not too different from that of the city-average, i.e. α(P i ) = α(P i − P ) 2 . 10 Formally, note that expression 1 is a function that maps into itself, i.e. P 1 = H (P 1 ), where mixed equilibria are the values of P 1 in which H intersects the 45 degree line. If H crosses the 45 degrees line from above (below), then H < 1 (H > 1) and the equilibrium is stable (unstable). If α(P i ) is quadratic, then H is an increasing and convex function of P 1 . If α is sufficiently low, the model has one mixed (and stable) equilibrium. If α is sufficiently high, then two mixed equilibria arise with the first (second) equilibrium being stable (unstable). The stability condition, i.e. H < 1, implies S/(P (1 − P )) > (2αP 1 + 2αP 2 (S/(1 − S))).
pay curve exceeds that of natives and equilibrium is restored. Similarly, if there is a shock that increases the minority share, the natives' willingness to pay curve exceeds that of immigrants, subsequently reducing the minority share. Hence, point A equilibrium is stable. The opposite is true in the second equilibrium (point B), where any shock takes the minority share away from the initial equilibrium.
Insert Figure 1(a) here
Models that feature social interactions in housing demand typically exhibit multiple equilibria. Here, note that point C in Figure 1 (a) is also a stable equilibrium in which neighborhood 1 only hosts immigrants (P 1 = 1). In such an equilibrium, no native wants to enter the neighborhood, which is guaranteed by the following condition:
The housing price is determined by the marginal immigrant. Specifically:
Finally, point D in Figure 1 (a) is the model's tipping point, which is the highest minority share that can sustain a stable equilibrium 11 . With α quadratic, the tipping point (P t 1 ) is:
No stable neighborhood can exist between point D (the tipping point) and P 1 = 1, implying that neighborhoods to the left of the tipping point are transitioning towards the ghetto equilibrium.
Impact of urban renewal policy on neighborhood ethnic composition
An urban renewal policy increases the neighborhood amenity level G; however, the effects of the policy will differ depending on the nature of the equilibrium considered. We first study the policy effects in a mixed (and stable equilibrium). Then, we study the impacts of investing in a ghetto. Finally, we discuss the role of the urban renewal policy as a "big push" policy that might reverse the dynamics of neighborhoods that are tipping.
In a mixed (and stable equilibrium), the effects of increasing G on the minority share and housing price of neighborhood 1 are given by:
11 Formally, the tipping point satisfies H = 1.
and
Expression 6 indicates that investments in the neighborhood decrease the neighborhood minority share. To see this, note that the numerator is a negative term as the natives' willingness to pay for G exceeds that of immigrants (γ I < γ N ). In turn, the denominator is a positive term.
In fact, this is the same condition that guarantees that the mixed equilibrium is stable (see footnote 10). In terms of the housing price, expression 7 shows that investing in the neighborhood increases it. The first part of the expression is the city-level (weighted) average willingness to
The second part indicates that higher G decreases the proportion of immigrants in the neighborhood, which further contributes to the increase in the price of housing. Hence, the housing price increase exceeds the willingness to pay for G as it also incorporates the value that natives attach to the shift in the neighborhood's ethnic composition. Starting from a stable mixed equilibrium (point A), investing in the neighborhood increases the natives' willingness to pay to live in neighborhood 1, which shifts from the dashed to the dotted curve. In the new equilibrium (point B), the minority share is lower and the price of housing is higher. The arrival of native residents and the increase in housing prices in the intervened neighborhoods are actually among the policy's stated goals. This is also why income mixing policies are controversial. Investments in the neighborhood might eventually harm the low income residents of the treated neighborhoods. Note that higher amenities generate a price increase that exceeds the immigrants' willingness to pay. In our model, increasing G reduces immigrants' welfare as inframarginal immigrants in neighborhood 1 experience a housing price increase that exceeds the direct utility gain of higher amenities 13 .
Insert Figure 1(b) here
The effects of the policy, however, may differ greatly if the minority share is very high in the first place. In fact, in a ghetto equilibrium, small increases in G have no impact on the minority share in the neighborhood as long as condition 3 continues to hold. This suggests that once a neighborhood minority share is high, investments in the neighborhood are unlikely to attract natives since the value that they attach to a high immigrant share offsets any utility gain from a higher G. Despite there being no change in the ethnic composition of the neighborhood, the fact that there is a marginal immigrant implies that higher G increases the price of housing.
Specifically, inspecting 7 reveals that rasing G by one unit increases the price of housing by γ I units, which is the immigrants' willingness to pay for G.
12 If γ I = 0, then increasing G does not affect the immigrants' willingness to pay. 13 Of course, this model overstates the negative welfare effects of the policy since homeowners in the neighborhood would be protected from the housing price increase.
An important feature of urban renewal policies is that they are not intended to be marginal interventions. Rather, the purpose of such policies is to bring about substantial changes in targeted neighborhoods. Consider a neighborhood that is in a stable mixed equilibrium such as point A in Graph 1(c) where, again, we have assumed γ I = 0. Suppose that there is an increase in the city-level minority share (P increases), which reflects the context in which the Neighborhoods act was passed. As a consequence, the immigrants' willingness to pay curve moves upwards (solid gray line) and, as a result, this curve (solid line) exceeds that of the natives for all values of P 1 . This neighborhood has tipped, and starts to lose natives until it reaches point B where P 1 = 1. Card et al. (2008) have shown that unstable neighborhood dynamics are not rapid. Hence, urban renewal policies that are implemented when tipping has already started but has not yet been finalized can restore the neighborhood's stability. Specifically, investing in the neighborhood will shift the natives' willingness to pay curve upwards (gray dashed line).
Hence, the policy might bring the neighborhood back to the left of the tipping point (equilibrium C in this example). This seems to be the rationale underpinning the Neighborhoods Act, as the policy's goal was to deconcentrate poverty and immigration in a context where the immigrant share in deprived areas was growing rapidly.
Insert Between 2004 and 2010, there was an annual call for funding with an assigned yearly budget of 99 million EUR, to be distributed among the selected projects submitted by the local councils 14 . The length of the projects was fixed at 4 years. The funds were channeled as transfers from the regional government to the local councils. As a rule, the regional transfer could account for just 50% of the project, meaning that local governments had to cover the remaining 50%, possibly with transfers from other tiers of government. As discussed, the policy was clearly focused on investing in public spaces. As much as 80% of the funds was spent on public spaces and public use facilities, while an additional 10% was devoted to renovating the existing stock of apartment buildings. Finally, the remaining 10% was spent on social services aimed at improving the labor market performance of the neighborhoods' residents. By way of example, Appendix A shows the investments funded through the Santa Caterina & Sant Pere project, a 15 million EUR intervention carried out in Barcelona's city center.
14 Each municipality could only be awarded one project per call (two in the case of Barcelona).
Across the seven calls for funding, of the 450 applications received 143 were granted. However, owing to the fall in regional and local government revenues, the degree of execution is low among the projects accepted in the last calls. ities with less than 10,000 inhabitants. We do so because census tracts in these municipalities (which is the finest geographical detail for which data are available) do not provide a realistic approximation to neighborhoods. We also exclude a few cases in which the municipality underwent a complete redrawing of its census tract borders in the period under study. Finally, we focus on 39 interventions with an average investment of 3,065 EUR per inhabitant. The intervention areas have an average population of 13,000 inhabitants, indicating that investments were quite localized.
The selection process consisted of two rounds. In the first round, a deprivation index was calculated for each application. The index considers a large number of indicators measuring the following items: property value, characteristics of the housing stock (share of ≥ 4-storey apartment buildings without elevator, share of apartments without piped water or sewerage connection), high density, drastic population growth or decline, concentration of young and old people, non-EU immigration, proportion of welfare benefit users, unemployment rate, percentage of low-educated inhabitants, percentage of people at risk of social exclusion, deficit of public transportation, lack of parking space, lack of parks and green areas and a high vacancy rate in commercial property. The areas with a score above a certain threshold were considered in the second round.
In the second round, projects were ranked according to a final score determined by this deprivation index (with a weight of around 40%), the population size of the treated area together with more qualitative aspects of the project, including, the financial effort of the municipality, the type of project (historic district renovation or not), the involvement of the local community, and the adequacy of the project to policy goals. After ranking the projects on the basis of their final score, the budget limit of 99 million EUR implicitly defined a 'cut-off', which varied across calls depending on the proposed budget of the applicants at the top of the ranking.
The first column in Table 1 shows the average values of all indicators used in the deprivation index as well as the population size of the 39 projects analyzed here. As explained above, the projects were implemented in under-performing neighborhoods. Unemployment is about three percentage points higher than the regional average (12.8 vs. 10.2%), while the share of individuals (above 10 years) with no high-school diploma (or equivalent) is remarkably high (76% compared to the regional average of 40%). Treated neighborhoods also show a high presence of foreigners. In 2003, the share of non-EU15 immigrants was already high compared to the regional average (13.9 vs. 4.9%). Moreover, it was rising rapidly as the share of non-EU15 im- The Neighborhoods Act does not overlap in space and time with any other major urban interventions, which means that the estimated policy effects are not be confounded by concurrent urban policies. The EU URBAN projects are very similar in goals and nature with the interventions studied here. However, only two such projects have been implemented in Catalonia and neither coincide with the neighborhoods studied here. Likewise, Plan-E was a stimulus investment plan launched by the Spanish Government in the midst of the great recession (2008) and operationalized as transfers to local governments for investment. We analyzed all
Plan-E projects and confirmed that none of the accepted or rejected neighborhoods considered herein receives investments of any significant quantitative importance in relation to the Neighborhoods Act investments 17 .
Data and variables
We combine official data from the projects accepted and rejected under the Neighborhoods Act with data on population characteristics at the neighborhood level. In the case of the accepted 15 The largest inflows of (mostly low-skilled) immigrants originated primarily from Ecuador, Morocco, Romania projects, we have scores for all the indicators considered in the selection process (see Table 1 generally follow the census tract borders. However, in the north-eastern corner, there is a census tract that is only partially included in the intervention area. In such instances, to compute the population of the intervened area, we resort to imputations. Specifically, we do so based on the share of developed land of each tract that belongs to the intervention area 19 .
In the case of the outcome variables, we are interested in the long-run population dynamics at the neighborhood level. In terms of ethnic composition, we decompose the population into three groups: Natives, non-EU15 immigrants, and EU-15 immigrants. We divide the immigrants into these two groups as the policy goal is to reduce the concentration of non-EU15 immigrants 
Empirical approach
The main equation of interest is:
where ∆Y i is a measure of population change in neighborhood i , T i is a treatment indicator while X i is a vector containing the neighborhood characteristics used by policy-makers to determine treatment. We focus here on long-differences. Specifically, we examine changes in As reported in hoods experienced larger increases in the share of non-EU15 immigrants. As a result, treated neighborhoods experienced more marked compositional changes, in which the share of natives (non-EU15 immigrants) decreased (increased) more in the intervention neighborhoods. This implies that the underlying assumption in the differences-in-differences setting, namely, the parallel trends assumption, does not hold in our application. As a result, we adopt the OaxacaBlinder approach developed in Kline (2011). The estimator procedure involves two steps. In the first step, the control units are used to estimate the following auxiliary regression:
where the outcomes of interest, ∆Y i , is regressed on X i , the vector containing all the indicators listed in the top panel of Table 1 . In some specifications, we also include the lagged outcome measured during the pre-treatment period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . In a second step, using the coefficients estimated in 9, namelyβ, the average treatment effect is given by:
The first term of this estimator (μ) is the unconditional mean of the treated units while the second term is the counterfactual mean (for the treated units) obtained when using the estimated coefficients in 9, while N T is the number of treated neighborhoods. Note that this is the estimator of counterfactual means developed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) . Writing the counterfactual mean for treated units in matrix form and replacing the coefficient estimates by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) formula yields:
where D is a vector weighting the treated observations while W is a matrix that only weights the control observations. The expression preceding Y in equation 11 turns out to be a vector of weights, denoted by w. Hence, the counterfactual mean for the treated units is a weighted average of the control outcomes. These weights have two important properties. First, they guarantee that the mean of each and every control variable included in X is exactly the same in treated and re-weighted control samples, as reflected in the third column of Table 1 . Second, the w's can be interpreted as those of a propensity score re-weighting estimator in which the weights are proportional to the conditional odds of treatment. This estimator is particularly desirable in settings, such as ours, in which the number of controls exceeds that of treatments and the vector X contains a large number of variables (Kline, 2011). Moreover, in our application, the vector of controls X contains all neighborhood features that have been selected by policy-makers to determine treatment, reducing the risk that unobservable variables confound our estimates of interest.
The dotted lines in Figure 2 illustrate the weighted averages for the shares of natives, non-EU15 immigrants and EU-15 immigrants obtained from a specification in which the first step (specification 9) only includes the indicators listed in the top panel of Table 1 . While the treated and the unweighted control samples show clearly diverging pre-treatment neighborhood dynamics, the treated and the re-weighted control samples show very similar pre-treatment trends.
This is formally shown in the last columns of the bottom panel of Table 1 .
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Baseline results
In Table 2 , we present the baseline results for Equation 10 including different sets of controls.
Each row corresponds to a different estimation and shows the effect of the urban renewal pol-icy on a different outcome variable. Column 1 presents the results obtained when all variables shown in the top panel of Table 1 are used as controls. Note that these are all neighborhood characteristics used by policy-makers to select the treated neighborhoods. The estimates for all the outcome variables are small and statistically insignificant. This evidence suggests that, on average, the urban renewal policy had no effects on the population dynamics and educational composition of the intervention areas. The results for the shares of natives, non-EU15 and EU-15 immigrants are illustrated in Figure 2 . Each dotted line represents the evolution of each variable for the reweighted control sample. Hence, the policy effect is the vertical difference between the treated (solid line) and the reweighted control sample. The graphs also indicate that the urban renewal policy had little (if any) effect on population dynamics. Similarly, the graphs show that the results do not hinge on the time window specified in the regression analyses.
Insert Table 2 here
As detailed in Table 1 , the variables used for the treatment selection are drawn from three different sources: 1) the 2001 census; 2) the population registers; and, 3) data provided by the municipalities when completing the project application. The variables corresponding to sources 2) and 3) refer to different points in time depending on the specific call for funding in question. Table 1 suggests that treatment and the reweighted control groups show similar pre-trends, there might be efficiency gains by directly matching on pre-treatment trends in the outcome variable 21 . This is the most complete and, therefore, our preferred specification. The results are similar to those above, pointing once again to the null effects of the urban renewal policy on neighborhood population dynamics. For the sake of completeness, column 4 reports the OLS estimation. It should be noted that these results are very similar to those obtained with the OB procedure.
21 Busso et al. (2014) also match on pre-treatment outcomes.
Heterogeneous analyses
Although the baseline results indicate that, on average, there are no significant effects of the urban renewal policy on the population dynamics of the treated area, it could well be that these results are heterogeneous with respect to the characteristics of projects and neighborhoods. In Table 3 we focus on project heterogeneity while in Tables 4 and 5 we analyze the effects of interest by different neighborhood characteristics. The estimates reported throughout this section correspond to the more complete specification (column 3 in Table 2 ), which includes the 2001-2004 lagged outcome, and, as a result, pre-treatment trends between the treated and the reweighted control samples are exactly matched by construction 22 . Exploring these heterogeneous patterns can also shed light on the reasons why the policy was, on average, ineffective.
Effects by project size
One prediction of the model developed in Section 2 is that, if the minority share is relatively high, the policy will only be effective if the investment (G) is large enough to reverse the tipping point. In Table 3 , we present the estimations after dividing the interventions between those with low and high levels of investment. We use three criteria to divide the projects by size: Total amount invested, per capita investment, and per area investment. In the case of total investment (columns 1 and 2), we consider projects above and below the median (14 million EUR).
The results indicate that the impact of the urban renewal initiatives on neighborhood population dynamics are null even for the sub-sample of large projects in which the average investment is just above 16 million EUR. The same picture emerges when we consider investment per capita (above and below the median -2,459 EUR) in columns 3 and 4, and when we consider investment per area (above and below the median -0.46 million EUR per hectare) in columns 5 and 6.
These results indicate that investment in urban renewal has no effects on population dynamics even in the case of those projects that concentrate the highest sums of money.
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Effects by neighborhood type
The results reported in Table 3 for treated neighborhoods with a non-EU15 immigrant share below and above the median (12 percent), respectively. The results for the two sub-samples are qualitatively similar, corroborating the conclusion that the policy had no effects on neighborhood dynamics. Since the average non-EU15 immigrant share is 6.6 percent in the sample with low immigration, the results suggest that a high minority share is unlikely to account for the policy's total lack of impact.
Insert Table 4 here
In the model presented in section 2 we considered two population groups, natives and immigrants. The two key elements in that model are that the natives' income is higher than that of the immigrants and, at the same time, the natives prefer neighborhoods where the share of immigrants is low. Note, however, that preferences for neighbors might not be restricted to ethnicity.
Bayer et al. (2007) have shown for the San Francisco Bay area that, besides race, households prefer college-educated and rich neighbors. Hence, the two population groups in the model could alternatively be interpreted as poor and rich, or neighbors with high vs. low education (Glaeser, 2008) . In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 we explore heterogenous patterns with respect to the level of education. Specifically, we consider treated units with a population share (≥10 years of age)
without a high-school diploma below and above the median (76.6%). The results also remain close to zero for the two sub-samples. Finally, in columns 5 and 6 we divided the sample considering treated units with a deprivation index below and above the median (44.4), respectively.
This index is a function of all the deprivation indicators shown in the upper panel of Table 1 and, thus, the highest values indicate the greatest social needs. Again, the results indicate no policy effects for the two sub-samples. Note, however, that all the treated neighborhoods score above the deprivation index threshold set by policy-makers in order to exclude non-deprived neighborhoods. In fact, most of the treated neighborhoods are low-income neighborhoods that share a history of bad reputation and stigma (Nello, 2009) . Thus, the hypothesis that the ineffectiveness of the policy can be attributed to the unfavorable social mix in the treated neighborhoods does not strike us as implausible.
The characteristics and location of the treated neighborhoods may also affect the impact of the policy. In the model developed in Section 2, we only consider one exogenous amenity G, which reflects the quality of public spaces and facilities in the neighborhood. The policy guidelines distinguish between interventions in suburbs and historic districts; thus, it might be the case that people value more highly investments in public spaces in historic districts given their more central location and the (potential) historical-architectural value of the intervention areas. To explore this dimension of heterogeneity, in columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 we report the results for the impact of the urban renewal policy in suburbs (24 projects) and historic districts (15 projects). In order to adapt the matching strategy to this analysis, we further include as control variables, an indicator for suburbs and historic districts in columns 1 and 2, respectively. 24 24 Note that these adjustments were not necessary for the exercises conducted in Table 4 . There, the share of non-EU15 immigrants, the population share without a college degree and all the variables entering the deprivation Column 1 shows the estimates for the 24 suburbs, which indicate that there are no policy effects in these deprived areas. Column 2 presents the results for the urban renewal projects in the historic districts. Here, in contrast to all previous estimates, the results suggest that the urban renewal policy did have some impact on population dynamics. Specifically, for this subset of projects, interventions caused a 43% increase in the population of EU15 immigrants over the nine-year period between 2004 and 2013. Given the moderate size of this population group, this results in a modest .72 percentage point increase in the share of EU-15 immigrants in the treated historic districts.
Insert Table 5 here
Interventions in Barcelona's historic districts
Baum-Snow and Hartley (2016) (2016), we build parameter estimates with 95% confidence intervals based on the following bootstrap procedure. We draw three units from the entire population of treatments and controls and consider them as treated units, while the remaining units correspond to the control group. We then estimate the treatment coefficients and replicate this exercise 1,000 times. The 95% confidence interval is obtained as the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the empirical distribution of these estimates.
The results show that, when considering the treated areas located in historic districts, excluding those in the city of Barcelona, the urban renewal policies have no significant effects on population dynamics. This suggests that the results obtained in column 2 were entirely driven by the projects in Barcelona. The results in column 4 confirm that this is indeed the case. Taken index are already included among the controls considered when estimating equation 9. Hence, for the sample splits in Table 4 , treatments and controls are properly matched with respect to the variables used to split the samples. 25 During the same period, the city-level share of college graduates also increased, but to a lesser extent, rising from 21.2 to 32%. 26 The three interventions in Barceona's historic districts correspond to Santa Caterina i Sant Pau, Poble Sec and La bordeta.
at face value, the impact of the urban renewal projects in the historic districts of Barcelona are quite large. Over the period 2004 to 2013, the policy increased the native and EU15 immigrant populations by 13.4 and 70%, respectively. The point estimates, which are not statistically different from zero, also imply that overall population increased by 9.3%, while the count of non-EU15 immigrants fell by 25.2%. These different population growth rates meant considerable changes in the composition of these neighborhoods with the share of natives and EU15 immigrants increasing by 3.4 and 2.5 percentage points, respectively, and the percentage of non-EU15 immigrants falling by 5.8 percentage points. These changes in the ethnic composition of neighborhoods involved a sizable increase in the share of college graduates in the neighborhood. The effects recorded in Barcelona's three historic districts coupled with the policy's general ineffectiveness elsewhere is consistent with a tipping story in which the policy is unable to surpass the tipping point if the "big push" is of insufficient size. The share of non-EU15 immigrants is not especially low in the treated neighborhoods of Barcelona's historic districts. In fact, the 2003 (average) share of non-EU15 immigrants for these three projects is higher than the average recorded for all the treated neighborhoods (16.6 vs 14.0%). Hence, the low immigrant share is unlikely to explain why the policy was effective there. Although we are unable to test this hypothesis, the high historical-architectural value of these neighborhoods together with their central location might explain the effectiveness of the Neighborhoods Act in Barcelona's historic districts. In their study of enterprise zones, Briant et al. (2015) also document a high degree of heterogeneity with regards the effects of the policy and they show that differences in accessibility across the treated neighborhoods may account for these heterogeneous policy effects.
One valid concern is the possibility that Barcelona's historic districts might experience contemporaneous shocks in their population dynamics that may confound our estimates. To partly address these concerns, we conduct a placebo test using Madrid, given that its city center also underwent a process of urban revival in the period studied here. We select the three neighborhoods in Madrid's city center that are most similar to the three treated neighborhoods in Barcelona in terms of their probability of being treated 27 . The pre-treatment population dynamics of the three units selected in Madrid are reasonably similar to those of their Barcelona counterparts. Figure 3 shows the evolution in population of the three treated units in Barcelona's 27 To identify these three neighborhoods, we pool the sample of (121) controls and all the neighborhoods in (the municipality of) Madrid. With these data, we calculate the Oaxaca-Blinder weights as defined in Kline (2011) , reflecting the probability of treatment. The specification used includes the variables considered in column 2 of Table 2 , as well as an indicator for historic district. The probabilities of receiving treatment are plotted for all the neighborhoods of Madrid in Appendix C. The highest probabilities are those of Embajadores, La Chopera and Palos de Moguer which are the placebo treatments considered here.
historic districts (left panels) and of the three placebo units in Madrid (right panel). In contrast to the results reported in columns 5 and 6 in Table 5 , these figures correspond to estimates in which the lagged outcome is not included. Specifically, the specification of equation 9 corresponds to that of column 2 in Table 2 . The figure shows similar pre-treatment patterns, especially for the population shares of natives and non-EU15 immigrants. Admittedly, the share of EU15 immigrants is growing in both cities albeit at a higher rate in Barcelona. Note, however, that the estimates reported in Table 5 correspond to a specification in which treatments and controls are exactly matched in terms of their pre-treatment outcomes, too. Reassuringly, the estimates reported in the last column of Table 5 for Madrid indicate no effects.
Results at the census tract level
In the analyses reported above, the geographical unit of analysis has been the intervention area as designated in the Neighborhoods Act grant applications. In many cases, however, there is substantial heterogeneity in the amounts invested within these areas. 
28 .
Insert Table 6 here
The first column shows the baseline estimates. These correspond closely to the results reported in the third column of Table 2 , and indicate that the policy effects are, on average, null.
When we re-run the analysis considering only very large and localized projects (column 2), the results indicate no effects, even when we focus specifically on the 30 tracts receiving the largest sums of funding (above 3.5 million euros at the tract level). As for the characteristics of the 28 See Cameron and Miller (2015) for a discussion of standard errors clustering.
treated area, columns 3 and 4 report the estimates for interventions in the suburbs and the historic districts, respectively. Since the results obtained in Table 5 indicated that the effects found for historic districts were entirely driven by three interventions in Barcelona, in column 5 we report the results excluding Barcelona. Finally, column 6 shows the treatment effects estimated for the 42 census tracts belonging to the three projects carried out in historic districts in Barcelona.
Overall, our results are broadly consistent with those obtained when working with the intervention areas. First, the policy has no impact on the population dynamics of the suburbs. Second, when focusing on interventions in historic districts, the policy is found to reduce the share of non-EU15 immigrants in the intervention tracts by almost 3 percentage points. Third, when excluding the three projects in the historic districts of Barcelona, the result becomes statistically insignificant. Fourth, according to the (point) estimates, the urban renewal policies im- borhoods. One notable exception, however, is that of the interventions that targeted the historic districts of the city of Barcelona. There, the policy significantly increased the native and EU-15 immigrant populations, reduced the non-EU15 immigrant share of the population and increased the share of college graduates. Given that the city center is experiencing an ongoing process of urban revival, the policy seems to have augmented this process into these deprived neighborhoods.
The results of this paper indicate that income-mixing policies dependent on investments in public spaces and facilities in neighborhoods in which poverty and immigration concentrate are generally not effective, even in the case of high-cost projects. This finding contrasts with the fact that, in the historic districts of Barcelona, the same policy has had a marked impact on the population dynamics of the treated neighborhoods. This outcome is in line with previous studies showing that the effects of place-based policies can be highly heterogeneous (Becker et al., 2013; Briant et al., 2015) and that successful policy experiences cannot always be generalized to other urban contexts. Notes: OB estimates, with each entry representing one outcome variable. Control variables include i) all variables in Table 1 , ii) the 2001-2004 lagged outcome in the ethnic composition outcomes, and iii) an indicator for suburbs (column 1), an indicator for historic district (columns 2 and 3), and two indicators for historic district and municipality of Barcelona (column 4). Analytical robust standard errors in parenthesis where ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. In brackets, bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals based on 1,000 replications. In each column, each replica draws the corresponding number of treated observations (e.g. 3 for Barcelona's historic districts) and considers the rest as control units. The urban renewal policy is modelled as an increase in the neighborhood's amenity (↑ G).
In this illustration, we assume that γ I = 0, implying that increasing G does not affect the immigrants' willingness to pay. B is the post-intervention new minority share.
(c) Urban renewal policy and tipping reversal
Starting from A, there is an increase in the city-wide minority share P , shifting immigrants' willingness to pay upwards (gray solid line). As a result, B is the new ghetto equilibrium. The urban renewal policy is then implemented (↑ G) which shifts natives' willingness to pay upwards (gray dashed line). In this illustration, we assume γ I = 0, implying that higher G does not shift immigrants' willingness to pay. Hence, the post intervention equilibrium is point C. 
